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 Abstract  Social protection programs, especially cash transfer programs, have 
spread across low- and middle-income countries since the beginning of the millen-
nium, and are increasingly part of national development strategies to assist the poor 
and particularly the poorest. This chapter lays out a wide range of debates about the 
specifi c goals, targets, and conditions of social protection and cash transfers. While 
there is no single best program option, the authors identifi ed fi ve overriding princi-
ples for effective efforts. Thus social protection programs and cash transfers work 
best when they are: fair, assured, practical, large enough to impact household 
income, and popular. These principles need interpretation at the national level, 
because no model can be automatically transferred from one country to another. 
 Keywords  Unconditional cash transfers •  Trust •  Empowerment •  Poverty 
19.1  Introduction 
 Social protection programs, especially cash transfer programs, have spread across 
low-income and middle-income countries since the beginning of the millennium 
and are increasingly part of national development strategies (Hanlon et al.  2010 ). 1 
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When the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were being set in 2000–2001 
social protection was barely mentioned. Ten years later in 2010 at the United 
Nations “MDGs + 10 Summit,” sessions on every one of the eight goals referenced 
social protection programs as a means of achieving poverty reduction targets. 2 
 In the short term, well-designed social protection programs reduce poverty levels 
and ameliorate related suffering, particularly among the poorest (Barrientos and 
Hulme  2008 ). In the mid-term they allow many poor people to exercise their agency 
and pursue micro-level plans to increase their productivity and income. In the lon-
ger term, they create a generation of healthier and better educated people who can 
seize economic opportunities and contribute to broad-based economic growth. 
Additionally, when sudden crises spread across the world—as with the 2008 triple 
whammy of global food, fuel and fi nancial crises—these programs help poor fami-
lies cope with the unpredicted consequences of globalization. 
 Expanding across the Global South is a heterodox analysis that sees well- 
designed social protection schemes as contributing to several goals at the same time. 
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India, Indonesia, and China are paving the way, but 
the idea is spreading via a genuinely southern revolution. 3 The focus is on trusting 
the poor to use money wisely and to pursue objectives that poor people already want 
to do—send their children to school, improve their diet, and make small investments 
to increase their income. Cash transfers work especially well when money is tar-
geted at a relatively large group of people and is perceived as social assistance. 
 Aid donors from developed nations, now calling themselves development part-
ners, have responded after seeing that cash transfers have become an important part 
of social protection and increasingly recognize them as a legitimate development 
strategy. Aid donors and some elites in developing countries (especially ministers of 
fi nance and business elites), however, have much less trust in the poor. They tend to 
use terms like “safety nets,” “handouts,” and “doles” derogatorily, and to view trans-
fers as temporary or short-term solutions, rather than strategic elements that can 
help raise agricultural productivity, support micro-enterprise, and foster economic 
activity in marginalized regions. From the USA, where the poor are often blamed 
for their poverty, the tendency is to emphasize the centrality of conditions—such as 
school attendance for recipients’ children or engaging in public service—rather than 
to recognize conditionality as one design element of a program. Some programs 
work better with conditionality while others do not. Schady, one of the authors of 
the World Bank report  Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) is a strong advocate of 
conditions because he is convinced that the problem is the “persistently misguided 
beliefs” of the poor (Fizbein and Schady  2009 , 9). 4 Indeed in the USA, many spe-
cialists are not aware that unconditional cash transfers are a major element of social 
2 
 Hulme attended the MDGs + 10 Summit and witnessed this by agencies keen to incorporate social 
protection, social fl oors, and conditional cash transfers into future strategies. 
3 
 During the preparation of this manuscript Hulme was working with the government of Bangladesh 
on a national social protection strategy and the Asian Development Bank reviewing the “silent 
revolution” of social protection policy that has swept across Asia. 
4 
 Speaking at a meeting in London on May 26, 2009. 
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protection strategies across Asia and Africa: they talk only of CCTs because in the 
USA the general assumption is that all transfers must be conditional. 
 From Europe and especially from European donors, there is less suspicion of the 
poor and greater support for social protection and unconditional cash transfers, but 
also a tendency to view cash transfers as welfare or antipoverty measures, rather 
than as an essential component of national developmental strategies. The emphasis 
of European development efforts is on targeting to minimize expenditures and to 
ensure that the ultra-poor are the main (or only) benefi ciaries, because poverty 
reduction rather than national development is often the goal. 
 These three tendencies (Global South, USA, and European) refl ect different 
responses, both to recent economic crises and to the centrality of market-led develop-
ment. Back in 1944 the renowned economic historian Polanyi outlined what he called 
the “double movement” in the development of modern capitalism. The “self- regulating 
market” was promoted by governments with a host of special legislation and it did 
bring growth, but this free market could not work for labor and the environment. Low 
wages and unemployment created poverty and misery on a large scale, leading to the 
counter movement for “social protection,” which was increasingly supported in 
society, forcing governments to intervene in markets (Polanyi  2001 ; Putzel  2002 ). The 
failure of structural adjustments made in the 1980s and early 1990s to promote 
 economic growth in low-income countries, and of “social funds” to protect the poor 
and newly poor from capability depleting vulnerabilities, showed that palliative 
approaches to social protection were ineffective. The lack of development and the 
growth of poverty outside of China and India, culminating in the 1997 Asian fi nancial 
crisis, demonstrated the failures of neo-liberalism and the “Washington Consensus,” 
and brought the second part of the double movement—the push for social protection. 
The northern response, epitomized by the MDGs, provides a real increase in social 
spending and strict social targets for health and education, but also kept governments 
at arm’s length from the economy. The southern response, with Brazil’s  Bolsa familia 
as a classic example, has been cash transfers that shift the emphasis to providing poor 
people with the money necessary for them to take actions to end their own poverty and 
make greater use of economic opportunities. 5 
 Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa introduced large-scale social protection 
 programs in the late 1990s in a Polanyian response to the harm being done by a sole 
focus on the market as the answer to all development problems. This was a  challenge 
to the Washington Consensus, because the programs were (and are) redistributive 
and involve governments reallocating resources within countries. The initial 
response from the North was criticism and the commissioning of studies (Barrientos 
and Hulme  2008 ). These studies found that social protection programs worked and 
that cash transfer programs (with and without conditions) performed particularly 
well. They reduce both immediate and intergenerational poverty, stimulate the 
economy, and promote development—especially in marginal rural areas as shown 
in South Africa (Samson et al.  2004 ). 
5 
 Brazil,  Bolsa Família , see “A Biblioteca Virtual do Bolsa Família,” at  http://www.ipc-undp.org/mds.do 
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 Word of the success of the three trailblazers has spread across the Global South. 6 
At least 45 countries now have cash transfer programs, providing fi nancial support 
to more than 110 million families (Barrientos and Hulme  2010 ). Immediate poverty 
is being reduced by these efforts. Hundreds of thousands of children are now in 
school because their families can afford to buy them shoes and school clothes, and 
can get by without the few pennies the children could earn if kept out of school. 
Families are also investing small amounts to raise their own income with, for exam-
ple, cash transfers in rural Africa frequently being used to purchase fertilizer. These 
programs are still young and this is a global learning exercise. Experiences are 
being shared among continents; research and experimentation are leading to rapid 
modifi cations and improvements in similar programs. Serious analysts also recog-
nize that this is not a quest for the “optimal program,” but a contribution to the 
evolution of national social protection systems that need to be able to improve their 
performance, maintain political support, and adapt over time in response to changes 
in national problems and the international context. 
 The infl uence of the USA and European tendencies on the development of south-
ern programs varies from country to country, but key patterns can be recognized. In 
middle-income and larger countries domestic policy makers can “listen” to the USA 
conditionality and European targeting tendencies, and then decide how best to deal 
with these from a position of relative autonomy. In lower-income countries and in 
particular those that are smaller and aid dependent, the degree of autonomy is 
restricted and there is a real danger that the policies selected derive from external 
debates rather than being part of a nationally-owned policy discussion. The danger 
of aid donors dominating national policy formulation about social protection 
becomes a real prospect in such cases. Where there is a national political consensus 
on an action, however, it can be pushed through despite donor concerns. 
19.2  Building Local Support 
 Building the required local political consensus for change is critical, but can be 
 complex and will surely be different in each country. Political elites need to champion 
the role that effective social protection can play in national development, and the 
economic and business elites at least need to recognize the legitimacy of social 
 protection and cash transfers. Debates at the global level are also refl ected nationally. 
The wealthier in poor countries often hold the attitudes of Victorian Britain, blaming 
the undeserving poor for their poverty. These attitudes have been reinforced by three 
decades of neoliberalism, which promoted the idea that it was “good” to get rich. 
A study of economic elites in fi ve southern countries found a consensus that “trickle 
6 
 The achievements of programs in Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa were rapidly and widely 
 disseminated. Other successful programs such as Bangladesh’s Secondary School Stipend for 
Girls (basically a conditional cash transfer to increase female participation in secondary educa-
tion), were not so well “marketed” and other Asian successes are much less reported. 
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down” growth—growth in the economy as a whole working its way down to the 
poorest—would eventually end poverty and that education was the most important 
means for improving the welfare of the poor (Reis and Moore  2005 ). 
 In a study of economic elites in Malawi, some admitted that they actually benefi t 
from poverty (Kalebe-Nyamongo  2009 ). The poor provide cheap labor and votes, as 
well as jobs in the aid industry. However, there was not a perception among the elite 
in Malawi that the poor are lazy, and thus there was not a distinction between 
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor. Nevertheless the elites believed that poverty 
will never be reduced and that the poor were responsible for their own poverty—that 
the poor do not work hard because they are resigned to poverty as a normal way of 
life—and thus the elites worried that cash transfers create dependency. This may be 
refl ective of Malawi’s experience with a very narrow cash transfer program that 
only targeted the labor constrained ultra-poor. In the mid-2000s the government’s 
preference for a fertilizer subsidy program for small farmers, rather than a cash 
transfer program for the poor, refl ected the elitist view that people should be encour-
aged to work (to its credit, the subsidy did raise productivity and improve household 
food security very quickly). 
 By contrast in Brazil only 1 % of a sample of 311 members of the economic elite 
blamed poverty on a lack of effort by the poor (Reis  2005 ,  2009 ). Nearly half blamed 
a lack of state efforts or the lack of political will, and most elites believed that the 
state has a responsibility to provide for the poor. Brazilian elites view poverty and 
inequality as problems, and are particularly concerned about their relationships with 
criminal violence. Perhaps it is not surprising in a country where the poor are not 
blamed and the state is given responsibility, that Brazil has taken a global lead in 
designing innovative social protection programs (including the systems that allow 
them to work well, such as unique identifi cation and national-level data coordina-
tion) and in fi nancing cash transfers. 
 Politics are important, and effective social protection programs can only be intro-
duced when a critical mass of support can be created. Hickey ( 2006 ) makes the 
point that civil society does not seem to play an important role in the introduction of 
cash transfer programs in Africa because the old, the poor, and the weak do not 
constitute politically active pressure groups. Thus it becomes essential to mobilize 
support within government, parliament, and political parties, and to use the electoral 
process. It is necessary to tap into the social responsibility attitudes of the business 
and social elites, and to convince both the elites and the middles classes that social 
protection programs are in their best interest—they will help create the conditions 
that the elites want, i.e., growing economies and more cohesive societies. The gen-
eral shift from a narrow welfare approach targeting only the poorest to a broader 
developmental approach that views social protection, not as poverty reduction but 
as national development, seems likely to make it easier to gain support. 
 Within governments, transfers (whether cash or in-kind) are often the responsi-
bility of administratively and politically weaker ministries that deal with social 
welfare or support for women and children. Finance and economic development 
ministries, which typically have more political and intellectual clout inside govern-
ments, need to address social protection as an essential component of social 
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development programs. That in turn means making the case that cash transfers are 
not just instruments for mitigating current poverty, but are profi table investments 
in long-term development that are as effective as roads and dams (indeed more 
effective than many dam projects that are often completed vastly over budget and 
under capacity). 
 Why do low-income governments often prefer fertilizer subsidies to social 
welfare programs? Why do donors appear to prefer welfare programs to fertilizer 
subsidies? Governments tend to view enhanced access to agricultural inputs as an 
investment in production, food security, and economic growth. Conversely they 
often regard welfare handouts to widows and orphans as an unaffordable luxury that 
generates apathy and dependency among the poor. A great deal of effort has been 
expended trying to convince skeptical governments (especially among fi nance 
ministries) that they are wrong about cash transfers, which can achieve poverty 
reduction and generate economic growth, but do not necessarily generate depen-
dency. This argument, however, is not yet won according to Devereux ( 2009 ).
 Making the case for social protection in low-income countries requires making it look polit-
ically attractive as well as fi scally affordable, to stakeholders who have to commit to it and 
will eventually have to pay for it. Politicians are more interested in evidence that social 
protection will win votes than in evidence that it reduces poverty 
 This point is underlined in a study of drought relief efforts in Africa by Munemo 
( 2008 ), who examined why some governments have preferred universal food aid 
while others—or the same governments at different times—have opted for work- 
based relief schemes. Munemo fi nds, not surprisingly, that incumbent governments 
that are vulnerable to the loss of political power tend to prefer measures with imme-
diate benefi ts for a broader base of voters. Political groups that are more secure in 
their position can afford to opt for programs that are more targeted on smaller 
groups and that are developmental with longer temporal horizons. 
 Political and even patronage power need to be mobilized in support of social 
protection programs. This will vary radically among countries. For example both 
China and Brazil have decentralized their cash transfer programs to municipalities, 
which allows local elected offi cials to take the political credit. By contrast, in 
Bangladesh political parties and politicians are loath to provide social protection 
programs in urban areas where they do not convey infl uence over voting behaviors 
in the ways that social protection efforts in rural areas do. 
 Public attitudes are important and the media affect the way that people think. The 
prevalence of articles about “welfare scroungers” contributes to a climate that 
stresses the “undeserving poor,” while articles about rising school attendance and 
new businesses begun on a shoestring—although less common—support approaches 
designed to give people the economic security they need to take the risks and make 
the micro-investments that lift them out of household poverty traps. There is also a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between political leadership and media coverage. 
 In Ghana the Ministry of Manpower did not wait for media coverage, but instead 
launched a strong advocacy media campaign to explain to the public that giving 
money to poor people is not about “handouts,” but rather about support for children, 
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the elderly, and those who are not able to work (Sultan and Schrofer  2008 ). In a 
study of non-contributory pensions for the Chronic Poverty Research Centre in 
Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa, Pelham ( 2007 ) concluded that successful 
 programs built a bond between citizens and the state based on three factors—social 
solidarity linked to the value and contribution of the elderly in the household, the 
understanding that pensions are a permanent program that can be depended on, and 
acknowledgment of the role of the state in securing the welfare of its citizens. Local 
and global events can play important roles in creating change and openings for the 
introduction of social protection policies. The Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, the 
end of apartheid in South Africa, and the end of the military dictatorship in Brazil 
all created space for policy changes. Hickey ( 2006 , 25) points to the way social 
protection policies come to the fore “when the social impacts of liberalized capital-
ist economies become too great to be borne in political terms,” which was happen-
ing in Brazil and Mexico—the other half of Polanyi’s double movement. 
 Hickey’s research underlines the importance of electoral politics. Political par-
ties attempting to stay in power or win power can use cash transfers to win new 
constituencies or to strengthen existing ones. The balance can be quite complex. 
Middle class support is essential, and Hickey points to the need to include not just 
the very poorest. Programs which benefi t the middle class are more likely to win 
support. Fairness, justice, and social responsibility seem to be important, but are 
often relatively intangible elements of such political processes. 
 Brazil provides a particular example of the political dynamics at work. Brazil 
had come out of the 1964–1988 period of military dictatorship and the 1988 
 constitution stipulated poverty alleviation as a role of the state. The idea of a child 
benefi t as a fi rst step toward a basic income was proposed by the Workers Party 
[ Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)] and entered public debate. Because of decen-
tralization in Brazil, the idea was fi rst picked up by municipalities and by 1998, 
60 municipalities and four states had introduced a variety of child benefi t pro-
grams. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was running for re-election as national presi-
dent in 1998 against the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (“Lula”), so he adopted 
the child benefi t (as the  Bolsa Escola school grant) as a national program. Cardoso 
won a second term and  Bolsa Escola was scaled up. Lula subsequently won the 
presidential election in 2002 and expanded the program as the Family Grant 
( Bolsa Família ) (Melo  2007 ). 
 Expanding the program increased Lula’s popularity and he was re-elected in 
2006. “I like Lula a lot—he gave us  Bolsa Família . Many people today have a 
better life,” Selma Aguiar who runs a luncheonette in Vale do Mearim in the 
state of Maranhão later told BBC Brazil (Corrêa  2009 ). “He has improved our 
life, and that of many families, a lot. I receive R$122 [US $67] per month. I voted 
for Lula and I will vote for him again,” added Eliene da Silva Brito, a farmer 
with fi ve children. 
 In Lesotho the government was re-elected in 2008, in part because of the popu-
larity of the pension introduced in 2004. In Mexico the cash transfer not only sur-
vived the historic change in the government of Mexico in the 2000 elections, but the 
new administration of President Vicente Fox expanded its coverage from rural to 
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urban poor areas of the country, renaming it from  Progresa to  Oportunidades . 7 The 
program was politically popular because of the overwhelming and unprecedented 
evidence that it was alleviating poverty and encouraging the rural poor to send their 
children to school (Skoufi as  2005 ). In an opinion survey conducted in South Africa, 
exactly two-thirds of the population agreed with the statement “the government 
should spend more money on social grants for the poor, even if it means higher 
taxes” ( Noble et al.  2008 ). Perhaps more importantly taxpayers also agreed—the 
statement had the support of 59 % of the poor and 63 % of paid workers. So in South 
Africa social grants also win votes. In Bangladesh the incoming  Awami League 
government of 2009 cancelled the predecessor government’s “100 days work” cash- 
transfer scheme, but immediately launched a new but similar scheme so as not to 
lose political popularity. 
 Globally, social pensions seem to be the most popular programs for national 
governments: they are inclusive, satisfy instinctive desire to support the elderly, are 
good value, and are perceived as fair. For purely selfi sh reasons voters are attracted 
to the idea of universal pensions because it provides some peace of mind regarding 
one’s own fate, or that of a grandparent, aunt, friend, or neighbor, during old age. 
Finance and social welfare ministries also recognize that older people spend a sig-
nifi cant part of their pension on children and others in the household, so pensions 
have a broader demographic impact. Child benefi t programs, as in the case of South 
Africa, have similar broad appeal. 
 It appears that social protection programs, and especially cash transfers, can start 
small. Successful programs, however, are not narrowly targeted at specifi c groups 
with whom most voters cannot identify. They are established in a way that makes 
expansion obvious and possible—targeted on the poorest districts or individual 
municipalities which makes expansion to other districts a political goal, or targeted 
at poor children which makes expansion to a comprehensive child benefi t seem 
reasonable. 
 Nicaragua’s donor fi nanced “Social Protection Network” [ Red de Protección 
Social (RPS)] showed what can happen to a program without broad support. Its fi rst 
phase from 2000 to 2002 was spectacularly successful, improving nutrition, health, 
and school attendance rates (Moore  2009 ). For its second phase during 2002–2005, 
however, cash payments were cut from US$19 per family a month to US$12. 
Although the second phase was also successful, the program was abandoned in 
2005 by the government, even though continued funding was available. It was a 
textbook case of how not to design a popular program. First, in order to ensure that 
the program was not seen as “welfare,” it never mentioned poverty reduction as one 
of its goals. Instead the cash was presented purely as a way of buying behavioral 
change of the poor in order to build human capital and thus had no buy-in from the 
vast majority of people, who felt they already knew how to look after their children 
7 
 See Mexico— Oportunidades external evaluations in English at  http://evaluacion.oportunidades.
gob.mx:8010/en/index.php and in Spanish at  http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx:8010/es/
index.php 
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and thus would never benefi t. Second, the program was almost entirely driven by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and by a small group of key civil servants 
with experience in World Bank and IDB programs within the Emergency Social 
Investment Fund [ Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia (FISE)]. 
 Program administrators were under a large amount of pressure from the IDB to 
implement the RPS quickly, so they did not have time to build political support in 
congress with then President Enrique Bolaños and his Constitutional Liberal Party 
(PLC) or with the opposition party ( Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional ) and 
their leader Daniel Ortega who was subsequently elected president in 2006 and was 
openly opposed to the RPS. Although there was international praise for the pro-
gram, there was little domestic publicity for its success. Finally RPS proponents 
even failed to build support within the civil service. In 2002 it was moved from the 
FISE to the weaker Family Ministry, where there was discontent about the higher, 
donor funded salaries of the RPS staff. It was the family minister who decided in 
2005 not to continue the RPS despite continued availability of the IDB funds. 
 Honduras provides another example of the dangers of a small and politicized 
program. Honduras has been experimenting with its family grant program [ Programa 
de Asignación Familiar (PRAF)] for more than a decade. It was too small, however, 
to gain widespread support and created competition between the IDB and the gov-
ernment. Benefi ciaries were often chosen on political grounds rather than on need. 
Newly elected presidents in both 2002 and 2006 dismissed the entire PRAF staff 
and appointed new people. Not surprisingly PRAF became identifi ed as a political 
project of the governing party (Moore  2008 ; Osório  2008 ). Nicaragua and Honduras 
are, however, exceptions to a broader pattern. Where Southern governments have 
been able to take the lead and build a political consensus refl ecting local conditions 
and history, programs are generally proving popular, effective, and durable. 
19.3  Cash Transfers Work 
 Cash transfers can provide the essential boost necessary to lift people out of the 
poverty trap—they can be the proverbial boots that allow people to pull themselves 
up by their bootstraps. Virtually all evidence supports the conclusions that people 
typically spend the assistance money in meaningful ways and that the grants do not 
encourage people to be lazy or avoid work (Hanlon et al.  2010 ). For most poor 
people a lack of money is their biggest problem. Small farmers in Malawi do not 
need agricultural extension workers to tell them to use fertilizer on their maize, they 
need US$3.50 to buy half a bag of subsidized fertilizer. The  Oportunidades program 
recipients in Mexico have convinced even policy makers that they already knew 
how to make profi table investments and that all they needed was the money. Giving 
people money is proving to be amongst the best ways to stimulate local economic 
development in low-income countries. Social protection and cash transfers are not 
social programs that can wait until after economic growth has been achieved, instead 
they are an essential precursor to growth and a driver of development. 
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 Vuyiswa Magadla lived in a tiny house at the end of an alley in the Khayelitsha 
township of Cape Town, South Africa. She had diabetes and could not walk much 
or see well, and received a disability grant. She continued to work selling fruit and 
vegetables, and used money from her grant to buy fresh vegetables. She may not 
have been healthy, but she was a good trader and traveled quite far to a place in 
Nyanga East to buy produce, rather than from Mabhela’s wholesale closer to her 
home where vegetables were not as fresh. Fortunately the minibus driver did not 
charge her extra for her box of vegetables because she carried it on her lap (du Toit 
and Neves  2006 ). 
 For the poorest, the elderly, and the disabled, cash transfers are essential social 
welfare that can lift people out of destitution and allow them to buy food for a sec-
ond meal a day, but the importance of cash transfers is much broader. A key benefi t 
is enabling children to be better off as adults than their parents. This starts with more 
and better food when they are young, which prevents malnutrition, which is critical 
because the stunting caused by malnutrition is a mental as well as physical phenom-
enon, and children who do not develop properly never recapture that lost physical 
and mental development. Cash also allows children to attend school—they do not 
have to work to help support their family and money is available for clothes and 
books. Children who fi nish secondary school are much less likely to be poor as 
adults than those who do not. Cash transfers can be a critical investment in the next 
generation and in the long-term elimination of poverty (Hanlon et al.  2010 ). 
19.4  The Southern Alternative 
 Over the past decade social protection programs and particularly cash transfers have 
emerged as the response of the Global South to economic development and poverty 
reduction needs. The Washington Consensus free-market model of the 1980s and 
1990s did not bring economic growth and development to most developing coun-
tries, but rather often lead to increased poverty and inequality. In the industrialized 
North, social protection and cash-benefi t schemes expanded rapidly in the second 
half of the twentieth century, but these were largely insurance-based schemes that 
depended on a household breadwinner with a steady job. In the South, however, 
most people are small farmers, landless laborers, or are working in informal market 
sectors and cannot qualify for insurance coverage. The USA variant of the northern 
model is also built on an inherent distrust of poor people and on the assumption that 
the poor are a relatively small group—an assumption that is getting harder to sup-
port considering that 15 % of USA families required federal food assistance in 2011 
(Izzo  2011 ). 
 The Global South has been rethinking the problem from the bottom up. Poor 
people who have struggled to survive on tiny amounts of cash are good economists 
who use additional money effi ciently. Giving money directly to poor people is prov-
ing to solve three problems at once. First it alleviates immediate problems associ-
ated with poverty; much of the money is spent on more and better food. Second it 
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allows poor people to invest small amounts in their farms and small businesses, 
and all evidence supports the conclusion that ordinary people know how to make 
profi table investments. Furthermore money is spent locally, which stimulates local 
economies, increasing local demand and creating an upward economic spiral. Third, 
poor families can send their better fed children to school, creating a healthier and 
better educated next generation that will be more able to play an active role in devel-
opment. The key is to trust the judgment of poor people and to prioritize directly 
giving them cash—rather than projects, temporary welfare or vouchers (unless there 
is evidence from experimental schemes that vouchers work better)—money they 
can invest, use, and rely on. Cash transfers can be a key part of the ladder that lets 
people climb out of poverty traps. Letting people make their own choices about how 
to spend money is also empowering. 
 The late twentieth century was a very conservative period. The North, as well as 
economic elites in many countries of the South, tended to blame the poor for their 
poverty, and some still do not believe that poor people are able to act in the best 
interests of their children. The fi rst southern cash transfer programs began in middle- 
income countries, which could fund them with their own tax revenue and that were 
under increasing domestic political pressure to deal with worsening poverty associ-
ated with structural adjustment policies. The high degree of distrust meant that these 
programs have been extensively studied—all the more so when “experts” simply 
did not believe the initial results showing how well cash transfers were working. 
 The whole exercise began experimentally, but these programs were big, giving 
money to millions of families—not just the poorest of the poor, but also to larger 
groups who were below the poverty line. Each country started its programs differ-
ently. Programs were modifi ed in response to initial research, and the ideas and 
experiences spread as more countries introduced cash transfer programs. Research 
continued and there was increased sharing of information, experience, and ideas. 
 One lesson was that cash transfers are not a magic bullet; they do not work on 
their own. There must be schools and health posts that poor people have access to, 
as well as to land, improved agricultural technologies, and jobs. The biggest lesson, 
however, has been that people must have the minimum amount of money necessary 
to take advantage of schools, health facilities, and land. If they do have suffi cient 
money, they can take the lead in their own development. 
19.5  Northern Responses and Opportunities 
 Middle-income countries, particularly Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa pioneered 
the development of cash transfers, and their early success led many low-income 
countries to start programs that attracted donors and international development 
banks. This increased tensions, because aid donors and international agencies with 
headquarters in the North worried that simply giving money to the poor would waste 
their fi nancial aid and for some, reduce their power. Some of the Washington, 
DC-based institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), refuse to 
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trust the judgment of the poor and have tried to retain power by imposing expenditure 
ceilings and harsh conditions. Some of the European donors fi nd it hard to accept that 
cash transfers can contribute to development and thus might replace some of their 
traditional development programs, and therefore tend to support cash transfers only 
as social welfare. 
 Northern institutions are trying to catch up, but the initiative and the action 
remains in the South. The southern model of cash transfers is new, and in a learn-
ing culture it is evolving rapidly and it is not just about poverty and welfare. This 
movement has been conceptualized in the south and has driven a rethinking of 
development models—give money to the poor because they can be trusted to 
make better use of it than aid industry project offi cers and social workers. Lessons 
are being learned and experiences exchanged. New York is drawing on the 
 experiences of both South Africa and Mexico. Indonesia is also drawing on the 
experiences of Mexico and Ghana on Brazil’s. Pensions have spread from South 
Africa to neighboring states. South-South cooperation is challenging the estab-
lished wisdom of Washington and London as ideas diffuse from Brazil, India, 
Mexico, and elsewhere. 
 Just as cash transfers in the South have been mold-breaking, however, the most 
interesting responses in the North have come from outside the normal aid and devel-
opment network. US President Barak Obama specifi cally invited Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to speak at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh in 
September of 2009 to promote his policy of phasing out fuel subsidies and giving 
the money to the poor via cash transfers instead. It was an unexpected convergence 
of several policy lines. From a climate change perspective Obama was promoting an 
end to fossil fuel subsidies. Just 2 months beforehand Yudhoyono had been re- 
elected president with more than 60 % of the vote, and his landslide victory was 
credited in part to increased support from the poor through cash transfers (Harvey 
and Luce  2009 ; Perry  2009 ). Thus climate change, democracy, and cash transfers to 
help the poor are coming together in a new way. 
 One question often raised is how social assistance transfers can be delivered. 
Cash transfers provide an obvious solution. The most important point is that suc-
cessful cash transfers are both locally designed and transparent—local people 
make the choices about targeting and whether or not to impose conditions, but 
the distribution of funds is much easier to audit than conventional aid funded 
development projects. Thus northern taxpayers and donors could be more 
 adequately assured that their money was being distributed to children or poor 
families or the elderly. 
 Although the poorest countries, particularly in Africa, can afford limited cash 
transfer programs with their own resources, these programs will need outside 
fi nancial support for years to come in order to be effective. The shift in thinking, 
away from conventional aid projects toward budget support and block grants, 
points to cash transfers as the most effective way to distribute social assistance 
money—reducing poverty while promoting development, and (if skillfully 
designed) slowing climate change and reducing the likelihood of another fi nan-
cial crisis. 
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19.6  Five Principles 
 This chapter (and our book  Just Give Money to the Poor ) has laid out a wide range 
of debates about the specifi c goals, targets, and conditions of social protection and 
cash transfers. 8 Each country is developing its own model that refl ects its own needs, 
history, and politics. There is no single “best” program option, but we can outline 
fi ve overriding principles. Social protection programs and cash transfers work best 
when they are: fair, assured, practical, large enough to impact household income, 
and popular. 
 Fair . Transfers and grants must be perceived as fair, in that most citizens agree on 
the choice of who receives money and who does not. Categorical grants—giving to 
all or nearly all children or elderly—are usually seen as fair, but may not always 
target the neediest. A strategy of excluding the better off, as used in Brazil and 
South Africa, is sometimes seen as fairer than trying to distinguish between shades 
of poverty. Targeting the poorest or the ultra-poor requires much more care, because 
it can be divisive and create confl ict between neighbors when some receive support 
grants and others do not. Proxy means tests may be relatively accurate, but they are 
not easily understood by benefi ciaries. There is also the problem of poverty dynam-
ics. A household identifi ed as poor 3 months ago (when the household head was 
sick and unable to work) may not be poor today. The household next door, identifi ed 
as not being poor 3 months ago may now facing destitution after recent fl oods 
washed away its property. 
 Assured . Recipients must be certain that every month the money will arrive and that 
families can depend on it. Only then will families be able to make long-term plans 
like investments in education and income generation. The insurance function of 
grants is important because people know that if their crop fails or they fall ill, they 
will continue to receive some income—and this security allows people to take risks, 
such as experiment with new crops or travel farther to look for work. 
 Practical . Directly related to the previous two principles, there must be a system to 
fairly identify recipients and ensure they regularly receive their grant. This requires 
suffi cient trained civil servants to oversee and audit the system, and a reliable, secure 
banking or cash distribution system to deliver payments. Sophisticated proxy means 
tests and complex conditions are of little use if they cannot be applied correctly and 
consistently. Some countries have much more experienced civil services than others 
8 
 Other useful websites include: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Inter-
national Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), formerly the International Poverty 
Centre, in Brazil has an excellent Cash Transfers and Social Protection archive at  http://www.
ipc-undp.org/cct.do ; the Social Assistance in developing countries database 2007 at  http://www.
chronicpoverty.org/pubfi les/socialassistancedatabase_ version4_august2008.pdfversion 4.0 ; the 
Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester working papers on social protection at 
 http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/ ; and the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of 
Manchester research on Insecurity, Risk and Vulnerability at  http://www.chronicpoverty.org/
research-themes-vulnerability.php 
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and some countries, particularly in Africa, may be forced to adopt simpler systems 
because of a lack of capacity. There are a growing number of effective innovations 
for transferring cash where civil services are weak: through post offi ces, lottery 
agents, and even mobile phones. 
 Not Pennies . Grants must be large enough to cause a real change in behavior, such 
as growing new crops or sending children to school. For example, if the amount of 
money is only enough to let one extra child in the family go to school it may be 
insuffi cient. In rural African communities where cash incomes are very low and 
people produce a signifi cant amount of their own food, even a few dollars a month 
makes a huge difference in the choices they can make. In more industrialized coun-
tries where the cash poverty line and cost of living are higher, it requires more 
money to make a meaningful difference. Indications are that grants should ideally 
be not less than 20 % of household consumption and where this level is not met the 
grants are unlikely to have the desired effect. 
 Popular . Any social protection or grant program must be politically acceptable and 
hopefully are popular enough to win votes. Cash transfers are an important step on 
the road towards achieving social contracts in developing countries, towards replac-
ing confl ict and corruption with solidarity and social bonds. Donor initiated and 
driven programs are less likely to win approval than ones that have indigenous roots, 
even if they have an “optimal” design they will not have local ownership. 
 These principles need interpretation at the national level, because no models can 
be automatically transferred from one country to another. High quality technical 
analysis is needed alongside the recognition that effective programs need to be 
based on local political support. Each government will juggle goals and competing 
demands for resources, and develop its own approach. A decade of experience, 
however, shows that cash transfers work. To reduce poverty and promote develop-
ment, just give money to the poor. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
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